FLG’s anti-NATO diatribes make me continue to think about his repeated point: that NATO is useless and we should dissolve it. I’m rather sympathetic to this line of argument—I may even have endorsed it once on this blog—but I keep going back and forth. I’d like to lay out some of the issues involved, by way of a tentative argument in favor of preserving NATO for now. This is partly to clarify matters in my own head; I trust it will be of some interest to our devoted readers.
1) The issue of the preservation of NATO remains of great importance. Europe and North America together still constitute half or more of the world’s economy, trade, and military power; the question of whether they should be obligated to mutual defense is one of great weight. One shouldn’t treat the matter lightly.
2) A good conservative should be wary of tampering with an institution, for fear that it preserves far more than is apparent to our limited knowledge. One should presume that our interests are bound up in NATO in many small ways that are not immediately obvious.
3) NATO scarcely seems needed for its avowed mission: the collective defense of Europe and North America. (“America” hereafter, as I relegate Canada to its traditional oblivion.) America faces no threat—and neither, by and large, does Europe. The Muslim Mediterranean littoral presents zero military threat to Europe. Russia seemed this summer to present a threat to Eastern Europe—but the collapse of the price of oil seems to reduce that threat. If Russia at the last trough in oil price was defeated by Chechen rebels, and at the peak of the oil price can barely mount an incompetent invasion of Georgia, than it probably poses a minimal threat to European security in the short and medium term—and in the long term, Russia is a dying nation that will pose ever less threat to any of its neighbors, save from the destabilizing consequences of its own demographic weakness. The exception here is the Baltic States: they are so weak and so small that they probably do need a security guarantee from the entire West to deter Russia from armed incursion. On the other hand, the independence of the Baltic States is only marginally an American interest. To preserve NATO essentially to defend the Baltic States from Russia seems disproportionate.
4) NATO also has an unpleasant tendency to expand mindlessly — to wit, the clamor to incorporate Ukraine and Georgia. If we have a marginal interest in guaranteeing the independence of the Baltic States, we have no interest in guaranteeing the independence of Ukraine and Georgia. If no moderate policy is possible—if we cannot maintain NATO at its current size, but must choose between its disbandment and its expansion, the attraction of disbandment grows considerably.
5) FLG (not alone) argues that NATO allows the Europeans to act as irresponsible free-riders, and so should be disbanded to encourage them to take responsibility for their own defense, and to improve their national characters. I am not sure that I agree with his premise. NATO is useless, after all, because Europe faces no military threats to their homelands; since it faces no military threats, they have no need to spend in their self-defense. So far as defensive military spending goes, the Europeans therefore are correct to keep up a barebones military. Their lack of military investment precludes the possibility of military bluster against Russia (more on that later) or of independent military expeditions overseas (more on that later too), save perhaps French expeditions to coastal West Africa, but this is an issue separate from that of NATO. The formal existence of NATO I think has trivial effects on European military policy. Furthermore, should a clear and present danger emerge, I think Europe will re-arm at more or less the same rate, regardless of the existence of NATO.
6) A different line of argument — I think Alpheus argued this a few years ago, and/or Gowanus — is that NATO inhibits the reform of America’s military — preserves serried tanks and fighter jets on the German plain, still vigilant against Soviet attack, calcifies military planning in the Pentagon. The Iraq War has put paid to this: what remained of our European armed forces in 2002 has been halved since then, and the remnant radically restructured. Aside from the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, we have land and air forces that have been/are being reconfigured as forward bases for deployment further into Eurasia and Africa. Our Bosnian deployment has ended, and the Kosovo peacekeepers are miniscule. Our armored divisions are becoming Stryker brigades. Our European headquarters is half-deployed in Iraq, half in reserve for future Iraqi deployment. Perhaps NATO inhibited American military reform during the 1990s; I think that will not be the case again.
7) NATO serves unstated purposes. This has always been the case: NATO is meant to keep the Russians out, the Germans down, and the Americans in, was the traditional quip. So NATO serves purposes beyond its stated remit. Perhaps this is hypocritical — perhaps it is Rube Goldberg — but because it is so, NATO should only be dissolved if a substitute institution for these unstated purposes can be secured first.
8) The NATO guarantee secures the democratic political culture and the stability of various European countries. It captures various European security bureaucracies, aligns them with American bureaucracies and interests, and Americanizes them. It prevents a long-term drift of Europe away from the American alliance. It gives the Britons, Poles, Czechs, etc. an anchor to prevent their drift into the hostile, unAmerican political culture in the Franco-German axis.
9) NATO provides an anchor for American air and naval dominance in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Our naval bases and deployments of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean fleets depend on, among other things, our bases in Greenland, Iceland, Britain, the Azores, Spain, and Italy — which in turn depend (to some indeterminable extent) on the NATO alliance. Our dominance of the Mediterranean littoral — a crucial part of our projection of power into the Muslim world — relies upon a Sixth Fleet that in turn relies on this chain of naval bases and allied countries. To the extent that the defense of Israel remains in our interest, that too relies upon this chain of naval power, and the NATO alliance.
10) NATO provides a base for power projection abroad. Our deployment in Iraq depends on a resupply chain via our bases in Britain and Germany, overflight privileges, hospitals in Germany, etc. (By the by, there’s the value of NATO for you: the number of wounded American soldiers whose lives were saved because of our hospitals in Germany.) NATO provides the infrastructure for the deployment of American power farther into Eurasia and Africa — and although our European allies can veto such deployments (see the Turkish veto in 2003), NATO’s institutional architecture essentially means that they have to positively veto such deployments rather than positively permit them. Most Europeans opposed the Iraq War; NATO meant that America could use European territory as a base for that war regardless of that opposition. NATO shifts European political inertia significantly to our military advantage.
11) NATO allows for organized military bluster along its perimeter. This is particularly in reference to Russia: if the Russians are not going to invade Europe, they are perfectly willing to bluster and bully their neighbors — spy, use cyberwarfare, cut off oil, send subs and planes scouting into NATO waters and buzzing NATO ships — as a way to maximize their power in Europe. NATO organizes counter-bluster — e.g., preserving Estonia’s political and economic autonomy from Russia rather than its formal independence. Here, I think, is where FLG’s criticism is particularly telling: NATO allows the Europeans to run down their military bluster capabilities, and to depute it to the Americans. They’re not entirely toothless, but largely. It’s possible that abolishing NATO would give the Europeans incentive to improve these capabilities — but this is a narrowly defined advantage.
12) NATO allows for organized offensive military expeditions. This is completely unwarranted by the charter, but it so happens that it does work out that way, and this is a non-trivial advantage. Granted, not much better than trivial — European weeniness makes the NATO deployments against Somali pirates, or against the Taliban, rather pathetic. Still, they’re better than nothing — and there’s no reason to believe that absent NATO you’d get better than nothing. But then, NATO provided a framework for rather effective (largely American) air-strikes in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s, to decisive effect. This argues that this offensive capability has real potential value. Granted, the Europeans contribute little to this offensive capability — but again, I don’t think NATO inhibits the development of this capability. To develop real offensive capability, the Europeans would have to invest some percentage points of GDP for a generation into their militaries — and this requires a political decision by a bipartisan majority of the various European countries. So NATO allows for offensive American expeditions with marginal European military support and more significant European political cover. All in all, a plus.
This summarizes what I take to be the various pluses and minuses of NATO. I don’t think NATO is remotely as important as it was during the Cold War, but it still serves American interests. FLG’s counter-argument in essence is one of opportunity costs — particularly, the costs of allowing the Europeans to remain free-riders. Since I’m not sure they’re free-riding, and I’m not sure NATO is that important in their decisionmaking, that tilts the argument in favor of preserving NATO in my mind.
One last thing, though: the inarguable argument in favor of NATO is that it preserves not just allies, but friends. I have not felt the Europeans were our friends since 2003, when the run-up to the Iraq War revealed just how far divorced our hearts were from each other. I have no faith that the Czechs and the Poles will remain pro-American for more than a generation. If the Europeans were our friends, I would favor NATO in all circumstances. Since they are only our allies, the argument for NATO rests purely on American interest. Indeed, the argument for NATO must justify itself against the considerable distaste I feel for many Europeans. I would be happy to be argued out of a belief in the utility of NATO, so I could leave the Europeans to their own devices. Alas, interest seems to argue for a continued intertwining of our affairs.